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 There has occurred of late a controversy of sorts regarding the vector of investment by the U.S. Navy. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter overruled 
certain aspects of the Navy’s fiscal year 2016 budget, directing funds away from 
presence-related items such as the littoral combat ship (LCS) and toward high-
end combat capabilities such as the F-35.1 Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
Admiral John Richardson categorized the ensuing debate about the functions of 
presence versus high-end military posture as a “false choice,” asserting that the 
Navy must provide both in a balanced manner.2 However, in an era of budget 
squeezes, marginal trade-offs meant to solve the problem, such as Carter’s Navy 
budget alterations, could result in a Navy that will be able to provide neither to 
a sufficient degree. Decisions on “fleet design” should be informed by an under-
standing of the relationship between forward engagement, in all its forms, and 
combat posture.3 Regarding these two functional elements of the Navy’s mission 
as either mutually exclusive or having a primary/collateral relationship is a recipe 
for strategic error.
Naval officers traditionally have viewed war-fighting readiness and dispersed 
presence as conflicting strategic functions. This view goes all the way back to 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, who wrote:
Police duty, it was called, and quite accurately, for the distribution was that of police, 
not that of a military organization calculated for military use. So American ships, and 
those of other nations, were dotted singly around the world, in separate ports; with 
single beats, like that of a policeman.
NWC_Autumn2016Review.indb   19 9/15/16   12:47 PM
1
Rubel: The Relationship between Global Naval Engagement and Naval War-Fi
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 2 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
How changed present conditions, how entirely concentration—which is military—
has taken the place of dispersion, it is needless to insist. This is the effect of Naval 
Strategy, adapted to changes in conditions.4
For most of the post–World War II history of the U.S. Navy, the issue of war-
fighting readiness versus presence essentially was moot because fleet size was 
large enough and geopolitical conditions were such that the two functions were 
carried out adequately and appropriately by the array of large combatants that 
constituted the fleet. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, fleet size 
began to shrink as a result of the “peace dividend,” and after the 9/11 attacks the 
geopolitical character of the world changed.
These were tectonic shifts for the Navy, and the previously mooted question 
of presence versus war-fighting posture became relevant again. The tension was 
illustrated by a disagreement that arose in 2005 between the Commander, Fleet 
Forces, Admiral John Nathman, and the Deputy CNO for Operations and Strat-
egy, Vice Admiral John Morgan.5 At the time, two Middle East wars, the require-
ment to secure the homeland from terrorist attack, and a progressively shrinking 
fleet were putting enormous pressure on the Navy. CNO Admiral Mike Mullen 
was searching for some new strategic recipe to reconcile and accommodate all 
the demands.
Admiral Morgan devised what he called the “3/1” strategy, which was really 
a template for fleet design. He depicted it as a sort of Venn diagram, with a large 
circle labeled “Major Contingency Operations” representing war-fighting readi-
ness. On the perimeter of the circle he positioned three smaller circles, labeled 
“Global War on Terror,” “Shaping,” and “Homeland Defense.” These circles only 
partly overlaid the big circle, implying that these missions required forces that 
were not suitable for high-end combat—smaller, cheaper, and thus more numer-
ous units that could generate more widespread presence, among other things.
Admiral Nathman disagreed with the depiction, and in his subsequent brief-
ings showed a slide that moved the smaller circles completely within the large 
one, implying that the forces designed for combat could perform these other mis-
sions as a collateral duty. Nathman’s logic was that if the Navy’s budget is tightly 
constrained, such that a choice between presence and war-fighting capability is 
forced, then war fighting gets the priority. Secretary Carter’s modification of the 
Navy’s budget indicates that this outlook is still held by at least some leaders in 
the Department of Defense, if not by many in the Navy itself.
However, that logic is a bit too simplistic for today’s world. The United States 
does not face a single global competitor as it did during the Cold War, and threats 
to both the homeland and American strategic interests around the world are far 
more diverse and varied than at any time in the past. Conventional forces are 
neither numerous enough nor suitable for addressing all the different threats that 
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confront the nation. The United States needs help from other countries if it is to 
maintain a favorable world order—help at almost all levels of conflict. Constrict-
ing the Navy to a unilateral conventional combat design will compromise its 
ability to conduct the global engagement necessary to create the interoperability 
as well as the trust and confidence needed to obtain that help.
THE ENGAGEMENT LAYER CAKE
The premise of this article is that there is a positive relationship between interna-
tional naval engagement and a robust war-fighting posture. That relationship is 
neither simple nor easy nor straightforward. However, the framework for it can 
be depicted with some clarity via the metaphor of a multitiered cake, each higher 
layer having a smaller diameter than the one below, with diameter denoting the 
number of nations participating. Our cake will consist of five layers, as shown in 
the figure, starting at the top and working down.
The first thing to note is that the prospects for wide international cooperation 
decrease at each higher level of conflict, with war fighting that involves major 
powers featuring either few or no allies. The Navy’s 2007 strategy document en-
titled “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” or CS21, established 
the lowest layer—routine maritime security in defense of the global system of 
commerce and security—as a universal mission.6 However, it also said that in 
times of crisis trust and confidence cannot be surged; they must be built progres-
sively day by day. If the United States and its Navy do this well, then the hoped-
for effect is that the diameter of the upper layers will expand: the United States 
will have more potential coalition partners available. Of course, not every nation 
has the means to join in major naval operations, but this is not necessary to ex-
pand the layer. Supporting functions such as allowing overflights or providing 
basing or simply political support 
can improve the Navy’s prospects 
in combat significantly. These are 
national policy issues, but a strong 
naval relationship can have a posi-
tive influence.
The 9/11 attacks demonstrated 
that terrorists can do serious dam-
age to the nation; the economic and 
political disruptions of the 2001 at-
tacks are being felt still. Whereas in 
the past the threat to the homeland 
was from either nuclear or conven-
tional military forces of another 
Routine Maritime Security Operations
Disaster Response and Peacekeeping
Crisis among Major Powers
Regional Crisis among Small States
High-End
War Fighting
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nation, now terrorism constitutes the main worry. However, whatever the mili-
tary outcomes achieved in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other places, there still 
exists the inherent danger of some previously unknown terrorist organization 
mounting a 9/11-style attack. The air transportation system has been substan-
tially secured, but the nation’s coastline is extensive and the continued flow of 
illegal drugs into the country via the sea serves notice that maritime security 
requires continuing attention. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks the Navy and Coast 
Guard engaged in considerable planning and gaming to concoct a strategy for 
securing America’s coastline. It quickly became clear to both services that there 
were not enough forces to adopt a patrolling strategy. After several years of work-
ing the issue, the only solution that presented itself was a global partnership for 
maritime security among as many world navies as possible. Information sharing, 
lubricated by trust and confidence built through routine and repeated peacetime 
engagement, was key to its effectiveness. However, the invasion of Iraq generated 
a lot of international discomfort with and resentment toward the United States, 
making the securing of such cooperation problematic.
The 2007 CS21, while pitched as a comprehensive new national maritime 
strategy, had an underlying purpose (intended or not) that was relatively narrow: 
to help engender a global maritime partnership that would reduce the chances 
that terrorists could use the seas as avenues of attack on the homeland of the 
United States or those of friendly nations.7 The document called for concentrat-
ing “combat credible” forces in the Middle East and Far East, and distributing 
“mission tailored” forces around the world to conduct engagement and cultivate 
the global maritime security partnership. A key tenet of the document was that, 
as mentioned above, trust and confidence among navies must be built patiently 
day by day and cannot be “surged” in times of crisis.
During the Cold War, U.S. membership in NATO provided the U.S. Navy a 
built-in alliance with European navies, supported by a formalized command 
structure and set doctrine and procedures. In the post–Cold War era, NATO 
nations have reduced their defense spending and have reduced their naval forces 
significantly. Moreover, the locus of potential major-power conflict has shifted 
to the Middle East and East Asia. Outside of defense pacts with Japan, with its 
growing navy, and South Korea and Australia, the United States has little in the 
way of formal arrangements that would underpin joint naval operations. How-
ever, nations such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and even Vietnam possess small 
but potentially significant navies and strategic geography that could be valuable 
to the United States in the event of conflict with China. Similarly, a variety of na-
tions in the Persian Gulf region possess both navies and geography of potential 
utility to the United States if war with Iran breaks out. However, without an alli-
ance structure like NATO’s, the framework for and details of cooperation either 
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must be ad-libbed in crisis (surging trust and confidence) or, preferably, worked 
out deliberately in peacetime.
Most nations not bound into an alliance, while happy to conduct joint training 
with the U.S. Navy, are not anxious to commit to an a priori anti-Iran or anti-
China alliance. However, as Iranian and Chinese aggressiveness build over time, 
the United States needs to weave together as many threads of a naval coalition 
as possible, both to enhance deterrence and to complicate potential opponents’ 
military operations. This fabric must be woven, per the logic of the 2007 CS21, 
gradually over time. Familiarity and confidence that would lead to close coop-
eration in the event of war are never givens; each state will act according to its 
sovereign interests. However, routine and iterative engagement on peacetime 
missions such as maritime security helps increase the odds that effective coopera-
tion at higher levels on the spectrum of conflict will emerge more effectively and 
in a more timely manner.
ENGAGEMENT AS A COMPONENT OF FLEET DESIGN
There are various reasons for a navy to want as many ships as it can get. The tra-
ditional and obvious reason is to outnumber a potential enemy in whatever class 
of ship is regarded as the “counting unit” of seapower. This increases the odds of 
victory in case of war, and thus also presumably enhances deterrence. However, 
if fewer ships can be had, then each one, under this logic, ought to be as powerful 
as possible. This approach makes perfect sense if the key to national security is 
the ability to win a decisive naval battle. Alfred Thayer Mahan advocated such a 
strategy, and in the geopolitical conditions of his day it made sense. It also makes 
sense if one’s ships individually decisively outclass any capability any potential 
enemy could bring to bear. This has been the case with American aircraft carri-
ers up until the last decade or so. They could approach virtually any shore with 
impunity and use their embarked airpower to deter or defeat local aggression. 
However, as they have become fewer in number and threats to them have become 
more credible, the logic of trading numbers for capability is starting to fray.
Another reason for having numerous ships is to be able to bring power and 
influence to bear in multiple locations at the same time. Since its founding, the 
United States routinely has dispersed naval forces around the globe to protect its 
commercial and political interests. Most often, this aspect of naval strategy has 
not required powerful forces, only individual ships or small squadrons. On the 
other hand, during the Cold War, the United States needed powerful forces for 
routine forward presence at multiple locations around Eurasia, and so maintained 
at least fifteen carrier battle groups. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the 
compelling reason to have so many groups, and the number has shrunk gradu-
ally to eleven. There are still reasons to have powerful groups forward, but eleven 
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carriers is not enough to use them as the default presence platform in a strategi-
cally comprehensive manner.
The 9/11 attacks produced a new kind of naval dispersion requirement: global 
maritime security. To protect America’s homeland and those of allies and friends 
from terrorist smuggling via the sea, the entire maritime environment has to be 
secured. As previously stated, the 2007 CS21 provided the basis for securing the 
international naval cooperation needed to attain comprehensive maritime secu-
rity. Beyond the interaction of individuals in symposia such as the International 
Seapower Symposium (ISS) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, interna-
tional war games, and personnel exchanges, the Navy found itself conducting 
large numbers of port visits in areas it normally had not frequented, such as the 
littoral of Africa, to increase the capabilities of smaller navies and reinforce com-
mitment and resolve. Initially the Navy conducted such engagements with its 
combatants and amphibious ships, but experience indicated that these smaller 
navies felt intimidated by such ships, so the Navy took to using smaller vessels, 
such as the catamaran high-speed vessel (HSV). This was at least a partial valida-
tion of Vice Admiral Morgan’s “3/1” strategy.
While Al Qaeda may have been crippled over the past fifteen years, it still 
maintains some capability. The rise of the Islamic State and the continuing vi-
ability of the Taliban indicate that maritime security is a strategic naval mission 
that cannot be taken for granted. While enormous gains in the development of a 
global maritime security partnership have been made, the structure is informal 
and voluntary, and so requires continuous effort to keep it going; and because it 
is not yet globally comprehensive, work is needed to bring more navies into the 
framework. While individual and organizational engagement constitutes a large 
part of the effort, ship visits and joint exercises are still required, and these mis-
sions demand a fleet of vessels tailored to the job, in both character and number. 
Given the potential strategic damage that an attack—say, a biological one—from 
the sea could cause, or the impact on the economy of shutting down air traffic 
after an airliner has been brought down by a smuggled man-portable surface-to-
air missile, maritime security is an inherent and critical component of the Navy’s 
strategic mission portfolio, and therefore a necessary component of fleet design.
Cooperation on maritime security is based on a shared unity of purpose 
among nations. As former Colombian CNO Admiral Guillermo Barrera has said, 
“Any nation that benefits from the sea has a responsibility to help secure it.”8 That 
unity of purpose is based on the notion that globalization has created a world 
economic system in which every nation has a stake. But the system is subject to 
any number of threats and disruptions, ranging from maritime piracy to major-
power war. In theory, missions involving defense of the system that occur at any 
level of the layer cake become a responsibility of all nations, contributing as each 
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is able. Such an attitude is strategically important to the United States in its efforts 
both to secure its coasts and to deter aggression by “rogues” and near peers. This 
attitude was evinced to some extent during the Korean War, when twenty-two na-
tions joined the United Nations Command in one way or another. The argument 
advanced by this article is that such cooperation can be made more likely and 
more widespread in the maritime realm by constant engagement and coopera-
tion on maritime security, disaster relief, and a host of other peacetime missions.
The linkage between routine maritime security work and higher levels of con-
flict can be illustrated by a notional example. In the South China Sea there are 
numerous overlapping territorial claims. Currently China is building artificial 
islands to create military bases to back up its extensive—and illegal—claims. 
Southeast Asian nations mostly have small coastal navies that are unable to oper-
ate very far out at sea for very long. One method of maritime security cooperation 
in the capacity-building realm would be for the U.S. Navy to configure one of its 
San Antonio–class amphibious transport docks (LPDs) to function as a mother 
ship or sea base for Philippine, Vietnamese, Bruneian, and other navies’ patrol 
craft to build experience and confidence operating to the limit of their claimed 
exclusive economic zones. Routine operations by a number of nations inside 
contested waters could complicate the politics for China; China’s scope for easy 
expansionism would become more limited if such operations stimulated the 
confidence of Southeast Asian nations and resulted in their developing greater 
war-at-sea capabilities.
A governing concept of engagement is to avoid the perception that the United 
States simply is attempting to drag other nations into its own quarrels or to ad-
vance its own parochial strategic interests. This was a perception problem for 
the Navy in 2003–2006 as it attempted to secure international maritime security 
cooperation in the wake of the Iraq invasion. The United States was seen as an in-
terventionist power pursuing its own agenda, and this interfered with the ability 
of international naval leaders to develop closer ties with the U.S. Navy or to buy 
into the notion of global maritime security cooperation. The 2007 CS21 was able 
to reverse that perception both by involving a range of international navies in its 
development and through its inclusion of (1) the key concepts of defense of the 
global system; (2) the statement that preventing wars is as important as winning 
them; and (3) the framework of globally deployed, mission-tailored forces for 
engagement.9 Efforts such as Secretary Carter’s to curtail engagement capability 
(through reducing the buy of LCSs) to enhance war-fighting posture run counter 
to that concept.
The U.S. Navy’s latest strategy document, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready” (CS21R), is supposed to be a “re-
fresh” to the 2007 CS21. However, in this writer’s view, it is a completely different 
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document with different purposes. Whatever the new document’s virtues with 
respect to its intended purpose (and there are many), some of its language is at 
cross-purposes with the intent of its predecessor and could undermine the Navy’s 
efforts to engender increased levels of international naval cooperation. This con-
cern will not be readily apparent to most who read the new document, as it does 
contain language that calls for such cooperation.10 However, several sections of 
the document contain statements such as “Enhance the ability to command and 
control operations to project power from the sea in contested environments, 
including interoperability with partner nations.”11 There is good reason for the 
U.S. Navy to try to achieve interoperability with other navies for high-end combat 
operations, but CS21R does not distinguish clearly between cooperation for mar-
itime security and cooperation in combat. Other navies will parse the document 
closely, looking for hidden agendas. Conflating all naval cooperation functions 
from low end to high end will spark suspicions that the United States will try to 
drag international navies into wars in which their nations do not want to partici-
pate. This was precisely the problem Admiral Mullen faced back in 2005–2006 
as he attempted to put together the “thousand-ship navy” for maritime security 
purposes. It took the indirect approach of the 2007 CS21 to allay those fears.
This article contends that expanded engagement at lower levels of the engage-
ment layer cake will enhance, over time, the prospects for wider participation in 
higher-tiered missions. However, the process requires patience, commitment, 
and continuity over time to generate trust and confidence. Establishing a sense 
of unity of purpose is critical, and focus on the lower tiers is the most promising 
way to get that process started. As it evolves, work on training and equipping for 
higher-tiered missions can be undertaken as other countries and their navies be-
come politically ready for such moves. Of course, the U.S. Navy already conducts 
extensive engagement activities around the world; the issue is how future fleet 
design will affect the process.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is, of course, simply not the case that the Navy’s high-end power should be de-
signed on the basis of a bottom-up application of the global naval layer cake con-
cept. However, as the Navy gets smaller even as its global commitments remain 
constant or even increase, and as the cost of high-end combat units escalates, the 
Navy has to find relief somewhere. Forward-basing schemes and blue/gold crew-
ing concepts require various regional nations to agree to allow the U.S. Navy to 
establish at least temporary facilities in their territories. At the very least, applica-
tion of the naval engagement layer cake theory could facilitate the statesmanship 
needed to obtain such permission. Success along this line of effort would result 
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in more forward combat power at key locations. But this is more in the way of 
expressing a desired outcome than a recipe for implementation.
An obvious first step is for the Navy, via some new strategy document, to ac-
knowledge the importance of engagement work and to counteract any suspicions 
raised by CS21R. This would be not so much a sop to foreign navies as a course 
change to the internal culture of the Navy. Here again, quite obviously, the foun-
dation of the Navy ethos is war fighting and the warrior. However, given the long, 
glorious history of the Navy executing both strategic functions, the ethos of the 
naval warrior and that of the naval diplomat can exist side by side, with neither 
diluting the other. A new document must be developed with a clear understand-
ing of its purpose and its intended audience. It should distinguish clearly among 
the levels of naval cooperation and avoid language that could be interpreted as 
default U.S. presumptions of other nations’ policies in particular sets of circum-
stances. Despite its many strengths, CS21R contains such language.
As a midshipman and junior officer, I was taught that a naval officer is ca-
pable of performing literally any task that might come along—sort of a glorious 
amateur, in the Royal Navy tradition. And in fact, I have witnessed naval officers 
of all designators performing brilliantly in positions and situations way outside 
their backgrounds and training. That said, if the Navy is to take the engagement 
function seriously, it should have a cadre of personnel who can build progressive 
professional experience over time, allowing them to perform in a more sophisti-
cated manner than would be possible on a one-tour basis. It does not seem neces-
sary to establish a new designator when the Navy has at its disposal the existing 
foreign area officer (FAO) program. This program could be modified to include 
enlisted personnel and involve progressive assignments that would include mis-
sion command of partnership stations and perhaps command of HSVs or other 
ships that are most appropriate for engagement missions. A full definition of the 
engagement function could include designated flag billets, providing a viable 
promotion path for FAOs.
The big question in the minds of many is whether the Navy ought to divert 
shipbuilding and other programmatic resources to the engagement mission. 
The fear of those who regard such work as collateral is that any such diversion 
of resources will reduce unwisely the number of combatants the Navy has—a 
legitimate fear in a highly constrained budget environment. There are two ways 
of addressing this concern. First, as it happens, the Navy already has made a pro-
gram decision to procure a number of HSVs for logistic work, and already they 
have proved useful as platforms for various partnership station initiatives in Latin 
America and Africa. They are relatively cheap and the Navy is getting double use 
from them, as both a useful logistic platform and a useful engagement platform. 
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In the future, the Navy might get an additional use from them if a variety of anti-
ship and other missiles are containerized. The HSVs could become lethal com-
batants for specific purposes in specific areas under the emerging “distributed 
lethality” concept.12
There is also the matter of day-to-day execution of the layer cake theory. All 
the sea services must work together to make the process yield results. Wide dis-
persion of forces is necessary to conduct the engagement that widens the lower 
layers, but even with full Navy buy-in of the engagement function, ships and other 
resources still will be relatively scarce. A strategy must be developed for focusing 
resources where they will do the most good on a global basis. Not long after the 
issuance of the 2007 CS21, the Navy established the Global Engagement Strategy 
Division (N52), which was supposed to do that very thing. However, despite a 
good start, it was populated subsequently with desk officers whose purpose was 
to prepare the CNO for foreign engagements, thus changing the division’s focus 
from planning to execution. The Navy’s current force-distribution strategy is to 
“satisfice” combatant commander (COCOM) demands as best it can, but there is 
no global vision behind this, since each COCOM is interested almost exclusively 
in conditions in his theater. Most recently, the Navy’s “supply side” deployment 
scheme is based on availability of forces rather than strategy, and is receiv-
ing pushback from the COCOMs.13 The Navy must rehabilitate the strategy- 
development function of N52 so it can arm the CNO with arguments for force 
distribution that may not accord with COCOM requests for forces.
Normally, engagement is regarded as what forward-deployed forces do on a 
day-to-day peacetime basis. However, there is more to it. Foreign naval officers 
attend U.S. Navy education and training courses, and any number of naval train-
ing and education activities are undertaken in foreign countries. These are rela-
tively inexpensive measures compared with ship visits and exercises. The Navy 
ought to take more advantage of its shore establishment, especially by including 
such activities in its global engagement strategy. Clearly, such activities must be 
coordinated with COCOM theater security cooperation plans and policies, but—
unlike the distribution of forces afloat—the Navy has near-definitive authority 
for planning and executing them. Part of this branch of global naval engagement 
is the biennial ISS held at the Naval War College. Increasing attendance since 
the issuance of the 2007 CS21 has been an indicator of the health of the global 
maritime security partnership. In 2009–11, then-CNO Gary Roughead linked 
international war gaming conducted by the Naval War College to the ISS, with 
significant benefit. This linkage ought to be renewed, and a strategy for using the 
ISS to advance maritime security cooperation developed.
Finally, even if the Navy leverages the FAO corps for leadership in the en-
gagement function, the operant element of Navy culture is that diplomacy and 
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engagement are everybody’s business, from seaman to admiral. In the day-to-
day process of honing the Navy’s combat prowess, care should be taken to avoid 
presumptions that foreign navies might construe as arrogance. This is part and 
parcel of Theodore Roosevelt’s admonition that the United States should speak 
softly but carry a big stick. The Navy is precisely the big stick Roosevelt had in 
mind, but without deft international statesmanship on the part of all naval of-
ficers and sailors, that stick becomes increasingly brittle. To secure maximum 
international cooperation in times of crisis and war, patient, steady attention to 
the engagement function in peacetime will pay dividends. This is the connection 
between maritime security and naval war fighting.
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